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Abstract
This paper considers the idea of human personhood
from an interdisciplinary point of view. By noting
that the natural sciences have shifted from a deter-
ministic to a non-deterministic method, it considers
the idea of “emergence” as a crucial concept in its 
approach. Since emergence is an essential element
in complexity theory, this paper develops an ontolo-
gy of meaning called Emergent Hermeneutics (EH)
and compares it with Process-thought, information
theory, and Buddhist philosophy based on 
Lotus Sutra. It studies the so-called mind-brain prob-
lem through Emergent Hermeneutics. Finally, it
expresses the new insight using Karl Popper’s idea of
worlds 1, 2, and 3 in terms of a world 4.
Introduction
Civilization in the twenty-first century will
inevitably require a global dialogue on science and
religion. Dialogue is something practiced by human
beings. Thus, the way religions view human beings
is critically important. Religion in this case should
be considered in a pluralistic way like culture, i.e., as
“religions.” One of the issues in the dialogue
between Buddhism and Christianity (in Japan) has
been whether the transcendent (God or Buddha) is
personal or impersonal. Since only human beings,
among all other entities, have personality, it seems to
me that the transcendent communicating with
human beings that have personality is of the greatest
importance. This belief may also be confirmed in our
era because human beings become depersonalized
day by day due to the development of advanced
mechanistic technology. This depersonalization is
the reason that I propose a religio-scientific realism.
This depersonalization is also the reason that I do not
agree with “Process-thought,” A.N. Whitehead’s
approach. It claims a “weak God,” although Process-
thought has developed many interesting ideas in this
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field (some of which will be mentioned in what fol-
lows). On the other hand, the position of one of the
Buddhist Sacred books, i.e., Lotus Sutra, “stresses
Eternal Personal Life” (where Buddha is personal).
T’ien-t’ai philosophy, based especially on Lotus
Sutra, also suggests a personal God (T’ien-t’ai was a
Chinese philosopher in the sixth century).
Many people today consider personality to be a
concept that is rooted philosophically in the work of
Immanuel Kant. For instance, in Japan, “education
based on personality” has been argued in accordance
with Kantian philosophy. Even scholars in religious
circles are no exceptions to this tendency. Kantian
moral philosophy, however, should be reconsidered
today because it came about as a strong reaction to
scientific determinism. Here we find a strong
dichotomy of science vs. person or nature vs. free-
dom. In order to overcome this dichotomy, we
should carry on a dialogue with recent scientific
anthropology. The result, I hope, will be to re-estab-
lish a contemporary concept of personality.
Today there is a consensus about the breakdown
of the notion of substance. All creatures are consid-
ered to be relational and not fixed. Everything, from
elementary particles to galaxies, is believed to be
changeable. Thus old-fashioned substantial hierar-
chies like Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Cartesian are
invalid. In this trend of thought, what is human per-
sonality? For a new way of viewing personality, I
want to propose an ontology of meaning (Section 3).
The purpose of this paper is to gain new insight
into the human person through recent discussions of
science and religion, and further to look for a way of
ascribing freedom to individuals in Japanese society.
From my position, which I call Emergent
Hermeneutics (EH), I will carry on a dialogue in this
paper with recent ideas developed, for example, by
(a) the science of complex systems, (b) Process-
thought, and (c) T’ien-t’ai philosophy. I do so by
using the ideas of (1) “emergence” from non-human
entities to human person, (2) the one-many relation-
ship, ( 3) the relation between information and actu-
al entity, and ( 4) the concept of the “experiencing
subject.”
Scientific anthropology and the human person
(A) From determinism to non-determinism
It seems that true humanity is being evaded step
by step through high technology today. The universe
is composed of many materials. Organisms, includ-
ing human beings, are understood as metabolic sys-
tems that are just combinations of DNA and protein.
The human mind, too, is reduced to the brain and the
function of neurons. In order to dare to say that the
human person is the most important creature today
when people are seen only as a combination of
genetic materials, we need a reasonable and persua-
sive explanation of what it means to be a person.
At the dawn of the modern age, René Descartes
(pro)claimed the freedom of mind. He arrived at his
cogito by pursuing certainty of knowledge, propos-
ing that the mind is a substance. Over against this
idea of mind as substance, he considered matter to be
another substance, a view that presented a dualistic
view of reality. This dualism, however, conceals one
major difficulty. The mind as a substance had its
own law unrelated with matter, while matter as a
substance also had its own law having nothing to do
with the mind. Although this dualism worked well in
the external world apart from humans, it did not
apply efficiently to human beings themselves. The
human mind and body are in a well-balanced rela-
tionship. Why is this balance so? Descartes assumed
some interrelation between mind and body, which
takes place in the pineal gland. Today this idea
sounds ridiculous. People are inclined to reduce the
mind to mere brain activity, explained in physiolog-
ical and physico-chemical terms, and are refusing to
attribute a peculiar law to the mind. This approach
had been the modern tendency up to at least 1980.
However, in recent years, the method of science has
undergone a transformation from a deterministic to a
non-deterministic model, rejecting a simplified
reductionism. It is crucially important to understand
the implications of this tendency for philosophy and
theology for the twenty-first century.
While this tendency is present at the frontiers of
science, the majority of people still believe in a 
scientifically deterministic worldview. If it is pushed
to an extreme, human free will or self is denied,
negating human free personality. Such 
an extreme is usually avoided by a convenient 
procedure, i.e., dividing reality up into two parts: a
scientifically deterministic world and a free person-
al world. Between these two worlds, there is no
interrelation that grants humans a “holy personal
world.” This dualistic view is what Kant proposed.
The dualistic view-science vs. person (or nature vs.
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freedom)-resulted in the framework of Kantian
moral philosophy. Even though this moral philoso-
phy is now very much out of style, some religious
groups still insist on it to protect the “holy personal
world.” Ordinary common people today live in a
highly technologically determined society in which
the Kantian “holy personal world” has no real basis.
Where did this misleading Kantian idea come from?
It came from the assumption of the “free personal
world,” which was only a reaction to the “scientifi-
cally deterministic world.”
Our contemporary task, therefore, is to show that
the idea of a “scientifically deterministic world” is
not valid today. I know that Process-philosophy as
an organic philosophy has for many years proposed
a non-deterministic view of the world. However, it
seems to me that it has been proposed as merely a
metaphysical dogma from the top down. My strate-
gy is first of all to observe the real world in dialogue
with today’s science, and next to construct a theory
of reality. This order in theorizing, from bottom up
or from epistemology to metaphysics, is called 
critical realism by John Polkinghorne.1
Today, the view that matter follows a determinis-
tic law has been drastically changed. This change of
view has nothing to do with quantum theory, as is
usually mentioned by many philosophers. It is not
concerned with the story of microscopic world
where the probabilistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics is well known, but with a story of our
everyday macroscopic world. A physical theory
about a microscopic world is not directly related to
an epistemology of our ordinary daily world because
Newtonian mechanics is valid here. Thus, a meta-
physical theory about our daily world is not directly
related to quantum epistemology, as is usually
thought. The change of view to which I refer is con-
cerned with our macroscopic daily world, i.e., chaos
theory, non-equilibrium thermodynamic 
theory, or the science of complex systems in gener-
al. This view is also characterized by holism instead
of reductionism.
For instance, in chaos theory, a small difference in
two systems’ initial values will grow exponentially
to give drastically different behaviors in those sys-
tems. The belief that “a whole is not merely the
sum of its parts” is quite common in that system,
usually being non-linear. In the self-organization of
a biological system, for example, local interactions
among constituents in a lower level will give a cer-
tain macroscopic structure at the higher level, which
again gives feedback influences to the constituents
of the lower level. If that schema is seen only from
below, it appears mechanistic, and if seen only from
above, it appears vitalist or teleological. To describe
the combination of top-down and bottom-up togeth-
er as a whole, one can use the word “emergence,”
because an unexpected structural behavior suddenly
takes place there. In the natural world there are many
unexpected phenomena, which recent science has
gradually begun to articulate through a new method.
Such phenomena are unpredictable, though previ-
ously predictability was considered to be essential to
science. The methods of science are being trans-
formed to include a non-deterministic method. The
non-deterministic method is not the same as the
probabilistic method, where the probability can be
predicted. It is fair to say that the Newtonian deter-
ministic idea, which essentially dealt with linear,
continuous, and differentiable functions, is merely a
part of the whole of nature. At first glance, this is not
seen as a radical change of view in science, but in
fact it is. Eventually, it will have a truly major effect
on metaphysics.
We comment here on the concept of “emergence.”
The philosopher who first presented “emergence” as
a concept relating bottom-up and top-down is
Michael Polanyi (1891-1976). After noticing the lay-
ered structure from matter and machine to organism,
humanity, and society, he argued that the function of
the higher level could not be explained by the laws of
the lower level.2 He criticized so-called reductionism.
He said, “The higher level can be explained by ‘emer-
gence’ which is not included in the process in the
lower level.” 3 The word "emergence" is used in order
to clarify a discontinuity from one level to another. As
we will see later, this discontinuity is essentially
important in the emergence of human persons.
Our contemporary task, 
therefore, is to show that 
the idea of a “scientifically
deterministic world” is 
not valid today.
28 Pro Rege—March  2003
(B) Twentieth-century view of nature 
and Process-thought
Ian Barbour says that twentieth-century science
has departed significantly from the Newtonian con-
ception of nature. He identifies its five features as
follows:
1. In place of immutable order, or change as rear-
rangement, nature is now understood to be evolu-
tionary, dynamic, and emergent. Its basic forms have
changed radically and new types of phenomena have
appeared at successive levels in matter, life, mind,
and culture. Historicity is a basic characteristic of
nature, and science itself is historically conditioned.
2. In place of determinism, there is a complex com-
bination of law and chance, in fields as diverse as
quantum physics, thermodynamics, cosmology, and
biological evolution. Nature is characterized by both
structure and openness. The future cannot be predict-
ed in detail from the past, either in principle or in
practice.
3. Nature is understood to be relational, ecological,
and interdependent. Reality is constituted by events
and relationships rather than by separate substances
or separate particles. In epistemology, classical real-
ism now appears untenable; some interpreters advo-
cate instrumentalism, but I have defended critical
realism.
4. Reduction continues to be fruitful in the analysis of
the separate components of systems, but attention is
also given to systems and wholes themselves.
Distinctive holistic concepts are used to explain the
higher-level activities of systems, from organisms to
ecosystems. The interaction between systems or lev-
els can often be described as the communication of
information.
5. There is a hierarchy of levels within every organ-
ism (but not an extreme hierarchy of value among
beings, as in the medieval view, which could be used
to justify the exploitation of one group of beings by
another). Mind-body dualism finds little support in
science today. The contemporary scientific outlook is
less anthropocentric; human beings have capacities
not found elsewhere in nature, but they are products
of evolution and parts of an interdependent natural
order. Other creatures are valuable in themselves.
Humanity is an integral part of nature. A human
being is a psychosomatic unity - a biological organ-
ism but also a responsible self.4
In summary, Barbour proposes “the image of nature
as a community—a historical community of interde-
pendent beings” and “will suggest that process
thought is particularly compatible with this view of
nature.”5 I basically agree with this opinion. And I
greatly appreciate Whiteheadian, Process-thought,
i.e., the development of a metaphysical category that
can be adapted to a continuum of diverse entities
continuously from small particles to the universe.
However, at the same time, I want to stress discon-
tinuous layers of many entities instead of continuity.
Each layer of being has its own laws. To notice these
different laws is most important for constructing
metaphysics. One good illustration of this disconti-
nuity is “emergence” from non-human entities to the
human.
(C) Definition of personality by “emergence”
Freedom and responsibility belong only to
humans, not to other entities. Things in the world
show discontinuity, i.e., stones, plants, animals, and
human beings, according to the layers of being. Why
do freedom and responsibility belong to humans
only? There is a strong difference in quality between
humans and animals. Here I will introduce the con-
cept “person” to distinguish humans from animals.
This “person” concept is closely related to the
“emergence” proposed in the last chapter of
Polanyi’s book Personal Knowledge. After dis-
cussing the layers of being, he says, “it is as mean-
ingless to represent life in terms of physics and
chemistry as it would be to interpret a grandfather
clock or a Shakespeare sonnet in terms of physics
and chemistry; and it is likewise meaningless to rep-
resent mind in terms of a machine or of a neural
model. Lower levels do not lack a bearing on higher
levels; they define the conditions of their success
and account for their failures, but they cannot
account for their success, for they cannot even
define it.”6
In this way, as an illustration from the lower lev-
els to higher levels, he talks about the emergence
from child to adult, or analogously from the animal
to the human as follows: “In the course of anthropo-
genesis, individuality develops from beginnings of a
purely vegetative character to successive stages of
active, perceptive, and eventually responsible per-
sonhood. This phylogenetic emergence is continu-
ous—just as ontogenetic emergence clearly is.”7
Here, “responsible personhood” is just what I
want to notice. “Personhood” is always associated
with responsibility. The “person” is also associated
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with freedom, kindness, mercy, tolerance, prudence,
self-control, and so on. Thus, we may establish “per-
son” as a unique character to the human only.
It seems to me that Process-thought lacks a theory
that can explain the uniqueness of human beings,
even though “emergence” is taken to be important.
Rather, the experience of organism (whose model is
a conscious person) exists there first, and this expe-
rience is attributed to actual entities. In this idea,
doesn’t human responsibility become ambiguous,
contrary to its initial intention? I want to follow 
bottom-up thinking, which enables the metaphysical
theory to suit scientific thinking. This is what 
critical realism proposes.
3. Mind-body problem and mind-brain problem
(A) Recent brain science
Chaos theory plays an important role in the rela-
tion of non-deterministic laws to the material world.
At the same time, it has recently been reported that
physiological function of a biological neurosystem
and the brain are well explained by chaos theory. 
In philosophy, due to the development of brain sci-
ence, the Cartesian mind-body problem has shifted
into the mind-brain problem. For myself, I doubt
whether the body can be reduced to a brain-neu-
rosystem in this context. Nevertheless, it may be
useful to consider the relation of the indeterministic
method of science to the mind-brain problem.
Ichiro Tsuda, a brain scientist, summarizes the
chaos phenomena appearing in a brain-neurosystem
in the following six points: storing information,
learning, pattern cognition, searching problem,
memory, writing and calling of memory.8 In these
phenomena, neural nets work through chaotic 
activity.
Tsuda also shows that a hermeneutic method is
useful in the cognitive activity of brain. This
hermeneutic method is useful because prejudice is
indispensable in cognitive activity. For example,
when a person sees the “duck-rabbit” diagram, one
person sees it as duck and another as a rabbit accord-
ing to their prejudice. This method is a way of
“understanding” something in general, where the
prejudice can be corrected step by step.
Understanding will be deepened historically and not
be completed. This incomplete understanding is one
of the reasons that computers will not replace
brains even in the future.9 Tsuda refers to the impor-
tance of metaphor to information arrangement in the
case of children's play, saying that “Children do not
react at once, but are doing tremendous information
arrangement inside their brains. Without output to
the outer world, they are making metaphors.
Behaviorism, where only stimulations from the out-
side and reactions to them are observable variables,
is not a useful method to know the essence of brain’s
information arrangement. The methodology of sci-
ence for research of matter is not valid in under-
standing the ‘interpreting brain’.”10
As a result, metaphorical and hermeneutic
approaches are important to creative work in inter-
disciplinary fields across science, philosophy, and
theology. In considering a border problem between
brain and mind, we assume that mind (psyche, soul, 
or heart) is an independent higher mode, irreducible
to brain, even though not an independent substance
which, nevertheless, interacts with the brain. Mind is
real “emergent” activity, different from brain.
An organism is subject to laws different from
material’s laws, though the organism’s laws are
based on the material’s laws. In a similar fashion, the
mind’s activity is not reduced to brain physiology,
though being based on it. Thus, I cannot agree with
the recent materialistic reductionism advocated by
some brain scientists such as Francis Crick.11 The
reason for my objection to the reductionism will be
justified in the following scientific illustration. It
depends on an analogy with phase transitions in mat-
ter. The simple phase transition from water to ice is
well known. When liquid water freezes, it loses sym-
metry: the molecules go from a situation for which
all locations are equivalent to one in which they are
preferentially arranged in a crystal structure.12 In
It seems to me that Process-
thought lacks a theory 
that can explain the 
uniqueness of human 
beings, even though 
“emergence” is taken 
to be important.
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general, when a downward phase transition of this
type occurs, the system loses a degree of freedom
(such as a rotational symmetry). In the case of water,
it goes from a state of higher symmetry (liquid) to a
broken-symmetry state (solid). It is quite a general
phenomenon. We notice here that loss of entropy or
gain of information (degree of order) occurs. If this
idea is applied to quantum field theory, the Nambu-
Goldstone theorem is obtained. The theorem entails
that a Nambu-Goldstone boson (new information)
always appears with the spontaneous breaking of a
(continuous) symmetry to compensate for this 
broken symmetry.
Thus, through an analogy with phase transitions in
physical phenomena, we can understand the mean-
ing of “emergence,” or the gain of a new degree of
order (information) that is not observed in the lower
level. Here is a metaphor for “emergence,” or more
than a metaphor. In fact, there is a group of scientists
who try to explain the relation of brain and mind in
a purely physical method. They identify mind with a
collective mode of the Nambu-Goldstone boson
coming from the quantization of the brain field.13 It
sounds like mere materialism, but may be taken to be
a fine illustration of the meaning of “emergence.”
We have confirmed that mind or consciousness
can be understood as a new and different mode from
the brain, even though depending on it. However, the
next question we ask is how the mind relates to the
brain. A higher-level structure may inversely influ-
ence the lower-level constituents. Let us hear the
opinion of John Eccles, awarded a Nobel prize in
medicine-physiology in 1963.
Eccles clearly distinguishes mind (self) from
brain.14 He takes the supplementary motor area of the
brain to be an important area. This part is inside the
frontal lobe, in front of the motor area, and abundant
in neurons acting before spontaneous movement. So
he thinks that the self first acts upon the supplemen-
tary motor area to make muscles begin voluntary
movements. The supplementary motor area is a liai-
son between the self and the brain in general.
How then does the self act upon the neurosystem
of the supplementary motor area? He explains this in
the following way. Neurons’ activities transmit
through synapses that number in the hundreds of
millions.15 Thus, when even a small stimulation by
the self is given to the synapses, the neurosystem as
a whole may change drastically. These phenomena
are very similar to chaos phenomena. A chaotic sys-
tem changes very rapidly with a variation of initial
conditions. In fact, as we have already seen, since
chaos phenomena are certainly observed in the
brain, synapses’ small fluctuations could be ampli-
fied in brain activity. Since, in the synapses, acethyl-
choline and other bio-polymers play important roles,
this small fluctuation can be at the molecular or
quantum level. The self may just act upon the brain
in the molecular or quantum fluctuation. As a result,
the brain can receive a large influence through
chaotic phenomena. Furthermore, if this small fluc-
tuation is supposed to be “information” instead of
energy, the law of energy conservation is preserved
in the whole activity.
The idea that the mind interacts with the brain
only through information is very attractive.
According to Greenfield, synapses’ formation
depend on one’s environment or education given.
When she says, “One’s synapses’ information deter-
mines one’s character,”16 a very different method of
personality theory, i.e., different from genetic deter-
minism, is possible. Thus “information” will be a
most useful variable (concept) when we approach
the mind from the point of view of natural science.
In this case the word “information” means more than
Shannon’s definition of information. If the mind and
synapses interact with each other through this “infor-
mation,” it is reasonable to say that God interacts
with the human through the “information.” The
“information” here will be interpreted as language
from the side of Geisteswissenschaft (social and
intellectual sciences).17
(B) How does God interact with matter?
The answer to the question “How does God inter-
act with physical phenomena?” was simple when the
deterministic method was popular. The interaction
was given by deterministic natural law. God main-
tained the order of the universe by sustaining the law
determined by Him. This is the meaning of divine
providence. Natural law is understood as the means
of providential government. You can see this law as
a manifestation of the faithfulness of God, or, by
neglecting God, you could also see it as the “unmer-
ciful iron law.” Either way, these views are close to
deism. The world is determined completely by all
initial conditions. The Laplacian Demon is just an
extreme expression of this.
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The reason that, since the nineteenth century, the-
ology has withdrawn from the natural world and
constrained itself to the existential or historical
world is due to this kind of determinism in science
(Dilthey, Troeltze, Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and 
so on). However, once you notice that the non-
deterministic view is real, all our ways of seeing the
natural world are radically changed. Unexpected
phenomena in nature are quite common. Natural
phenomena will not be determined from initial 
conditions at all. The region known exactly with the
scientific method is quite restricted. It becomes more
reasonable to expect God’s intervention not only in
miracles, but in the whole natural world. We need
more detailed arguments to see how God interacts
with matter, through a dialogue with science.
There is no need to include God inside the natural
world, but we should notice the meaning of the inde-
terminacy of the natural world. Indeterminacy does
not mean that there are no norms. God’s norms in
creation are there as a metaphysical hypothesis, but
the physical aspect of the reality to be humanly
known is not determined. For human beings, this
indeterminacy gives more occasion for freedom and
responsibility.
Process-thought has also spoken about human
freedom in relation to God.18 Human experience is
the starting point from which Process-thought 
generalizes and extrapolates to develop a set of meta-
physical categories that are exemplified by all enti-
ties. Self-creativity is part of the momentary present
of every entity. It is not surprising, then, that Process-
thought has no difficulty in representing human free-
dom in relation both to God and to causes from the
past. This freedom is close to our position of non-
determinism. In particular, omnipotence and predes-
tination are repudiated in favor of a God of persua-
sion, whose achievements in the world always
depend on the response of other entities. Process-the-
ism strongly endorses human responsibility to work
creatively to further God’s purposes, as well as rec-
ognizing human frailty and the constraints imposed
by the biological and social structures inherited from
the past. Humans are participants in an unfinished
universe and in God’s continuing work. God calls the
human to love, freedom, and justice. Time, history,
and nature are to be affirmed, for it is here that God’s
purposes can be carried forward. Process-thought
makes these claims.
I certainly agree that human responsibility is
important. I think, however, that our “response”
becomes possible only when the Person calls us. Do
we not need the “strong God” to respond to? I won-
der whether there is a strong God in Process-
thought. It seems to me that the personal Creator or
the “Eternal Personal Life” in Lotus Sutra is neces-
sary.
The concept of “emergence” will be useful also
for the relation of God and matter. The top-down and
bottom-up directions are not separated.
Polkinghorne has recently discussed the relation of
God and matter by using the notion of “causal joint.”
Referring to chaos theory, he argues that God relates
to matter only through “information” that is different
from energy. He calls God’s top-down relation
“active information.” 19
(C) Ontology of meaning and 
the experiencing subject.
The metaphysics of Process-philosophy is an
ontology of entities. Instead of an ontology of enti-
ties, I want to propose an ontology of meaning,
because the human mind characterizes entities and
events in the world. Human beings characterize real-
ity as meaning and understand it. I also want 
to show that these two types of ontology are con-
nected by the “experiencing subject.” What is the
“experiencing subject”?
Although Whitehead emphasizes the interdepen-
dence of events, he does not end with a monism in
which the parts are swallowed up in the whole..20
An event is not just the intersection of lines of inter-
action; it is an entity in its own right with its own
individuality. He maintains a genuine pluralism in
which every entity is a unique synthesis of the influ-
ences upon it, a new unity formed from an initial
diversity. Every entity takes account of other events
I certainly agree that human
responsibility is important. I
think, however, that our
“response” becomes possible
only when the Person calls us.
and reacts and responds to them. During the moment
when it is on its own, it is free to appropriate and
integrate its relationships in its own way. Each enti-
ty is a center of spontaneity and self-creation, con-
tributing distinctively to the world. Whitehead wants
us to look at the world from the viewpoint of the
entity itself, imagining it as an experiencing subject.
Normal usage of the word “experience” is appli-
cable only to a personal entity, i.e., the human, but he
extends this usage to the lower entities. In the fol-
lowing section, I hope to connect this “experiencing
subject” with a concept in what I call the ontology of
meaning.
4. The feature of the human mind: 
looking for meaning
American philosopher John Searle says that the
content of mind cannot be reduced to behaviorism,
functionalism, or physicalism. He identifies four fea-
tures of the human mind, namely consciousness,
intentionality, subjectivity, and causality. Conscious-
ness is manifestly realized for everybody.
Intentionality is the idea that beliefs, wishes, or fears
(for example) are always concrete; i.e., belief is a
belief in something, wish is a wish for something, or
fear is a fear of something. Subjectivity means that
my pain is felt only by me, not by you. Causality
means that the mind influences the physical world:
for example, if I decide to raise my hand, it rises.21
Here, intentionality is the state of mind directed
toward something: it is a concrete interrelation
between self and the object, with which I identify
“looking for meaning.” I think intentionality is the
basic feature of the human mind itself, not being a
part of the animal mind or computers. Intentionality
is an advanced function in the sense that language,
memory, and deduction are all integrated to produce
it. The mind looking for meaning inevitably wants to
find the Origin of the diverse meanings in the world,
and a unity of those meanings. “Looking for the
unity of diversity of meaning” seems to me a 
manifestation of the unity of human personality. It
also evokes a question, usually asked by the age of
puberty: who am I, or, what's the meaning of my
life? Through asking this question, the heart of the
human touches the religious root, just as St.
Augustine wrote, “Oh, God, our heart is restless
until it rests in You,” in the beginning chapter of his
Confessions.
(A) Meaning in Emergent Hermeneutics
What is meaning? To answer this question, we can
count such representative approaches in contempo-
rary philosophy as “meaning is verifiability” (logical
positivism), “meaning is the use of the word”
(Wittgenstein), “meaning is intentionality” (Fusser),
and “meaning is understanding” (Gadamer). By con-
sidering these definitions, the Emergent
Hermeneutics (EH) I propose gives a more compre-
hensive definition of meaning: “meaning is an expe-
rience that is a mode of being in a 
temporal event. When one sees the duck-rabbit 
figure, seeing it as a duck or a rabbit depends on
one’s pre-judgment. “Seeing-as” is an interpretation
at the level of the sense of sight and will be extend-
ed in a more general form to “experiencing-as.” The
human way of experience varies from person to per-
son. Even inside one and the same person, there are
many levels of experience. Let us define meaning in
“experiencing-as.”22 In daily life, we find many lev-
els of meaning as follows.
I see swans on a lake. They are five in all, swim-
ming slowly and floating in two groups, one of them
in the latter group seeming to be one week old.
(Numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, and biolog-
ical meanings are observed here.) The thesis “all
swans are white” is either verifiable or not. If there
is a black swan, it will be sold at a high price (sensi-
ble, logical, economical). When I was a child, I read
The Ugly Duckling, and once enjoyed the ballet
Swan Lake (historical, linguistic, aesthetic). On the
notice board near the lake is written, “Don’t take
swans from the lake.” We can hardly imagine a man
who would steal a swan. But it could happen, if he
believes in a strange religion that teaches getting
eternal life by sacrificing a swan! (Here are social,
legal, ethical, and pistic meanings.)
Seeing the swans, I found the diverse modes of
my experience of meaning, from the numerical and
spatial to the ethical and pistic, fifteen irreducible
levels.23 Usually we do not distinguish and articulate
the experiences of everyday life consciously in this
manner. When we begin to analyze reality, we
notice lower levels of meaning, being emergent step
by step to higher levels, which I call the meaning
aspects. As we articulate our experience through
the meaning aspects, entities in everyday life, from
vague situations, will be characterized clearly 
and ordered, that is, will acquire “information” 
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(corresponding, maybe, to “concrescence” in
Process-philosophy).
At the same time, the diversity of the meaning
aspect is “unified” coherently in my mind. This unity
explains why I “understand” myself and the real
world. “Understanding” is unique to human beings
and means more than “feeling,” to which Process-
philosophy sometimes refers. Here, unifying coher-
ently in my heart (or mind) includes both material
and mental meaning at the same time; therefore,
there is then no dual separation of mind and matter.
If not “unified,” my mind is being divided. In normal
conditions, however, my mind unifies the meaning
of reality without any effort. “Unifying the meaning”
cannot be explained scientifically and logically even
if today’s knowledge of brain physiology is used but
is done easily in my heart (or mind) intuitively.
Cases of multiple personalities are reported some-
times in psychiatric studies, personalities that appear
when a function of “unifying the meaning of diverse
experiences” is lost. In a normal case, the fact that
human beings are personal beings entails that the
heart is “unifying the meaning of diverse experi-
ences.” In other words, the human person “under-
stands” himself and the real world in the fullness of
meaning. Here, scientific personality by “emer-
gence” is continuously linked with a hermeneutic
view of personality. Furthermore, the concept of uni-
fying coherently in my heart (or mind) is very simi-
lar to the concept of Ichinen-sanzen ron (three thou-
sand worlds in each thought-instant) developed in
Mo-ho-chih-kuan (A.D. 594), the practical interpre-
tation of Lotus Sutra, by T’ien-t’ai Chih-i.
Visual data such as “lake,” “swan,” and “swim-
ming” come from the retina, through the intermedi-
ate brain, into the vision area in the occipital lobe,
and are recognized as distinct forms, colors, and spa-
tial relationships in the union area. But we realize it
at once 24 because our mind has a function of “unify-
ing.” We can call this unifying function “intuition.”
This intuition is not in the brain but is in the mind.
Intuition unifies all the meaning aspects of reality.25
Unifying diverse meaning is related to the notion
of a worldview. Worldview provides the point from
which the world is seen. That point is precisely
where the unity of meaning comes from. Different
points give different worldviews. I do not here 
consider any one point, or aspect, as providing the
ultimate unification of meaning. A materialist would
take the physical aspect (the fourth aspect) to be ulti-
mate, reducing all other meaning aspects to the
physical aspect. Its result is an absolutization of the
physical aspect. Vitalism is an absolutization of the
biological aspect (the fifth aspect), while collec-
tivism is an absolutization of the social aspect (the
tenth aspect).
None of the meaning aspects of temporal or
empirical reality should be absolutized because such
an absolutization breaks the harmonious meanings
of entities in reality. When the ultimate meaning as
the origin of meaning stands outside the empirical
world, entities in empirical reality as such are full 
of meaning. The origin of meaning should be the
transcendent, viz., Creator God or Eternal Buddha,
but the meaning is read out by the human heart itself.
Religious realism is thus presupposed in Emergent
Hermeneutics.
The fact that the diverse meaning aspects are irre-
ducible to each other is called sphere sovereignty. By
contrast, one aspect by itself reflects all the other
aspects (and so ad infinitum, like a fractal); this
reflection is called sphere universality (correspond-
ing to T’ien-t’ai Chih-i’s Jikkai-gogu, i.e., each of
the ten realms of beings contains the other nine in
itself). For instance, let us take the sensible aspect.
We notice that our feelings are coherently related to
all other aspects of meaning of reality. Feelings
become strong at, for instance, the age of puberty
(biological aspect), which necessarily is associated
with such harmonic matters as blood pressure or the
amount of human growth hormone within the body
(physical), and emotional change or movement
(kinematic) often will affect friendships within cer-
tain circles (spatial, numerical). At the same time,
the feelings are observed in higher levels such as
logical feeling, historical feeling, social feeling, 
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ethical feeling, and pistic feeling.
The fact that one meaning aspect includes the
lower aspects is called retrocipation. Inversely, the
fact that one meaning aspect anticipates higher
aspects is called anticipation. Including both retroci-
pation and anticipation results in analogy.
Corresponding to each aspect, there are particular
sciences. Theology is, for instance, a science of the
pistic aspect, and natural theology has analogies
with the physical and the biological aspects. Of
course, theology can include analogies with the his-
torical aspect and the social aspect.
I call the meaning aspects, from the viewpoint of
religious realism, “God’s law spheres,” just as
Herman Dooyeweerd called them, because reality is
created by God. This application of cosmological
laws is called Emergent Hermeneutics (EH), just as
the study of the application of legal laws is called
law hermeneutics. The relation of “the one and the
many” or unity and diversity in EH is similar to the
thesis that “the whole includes parts and parts
include the whole,” which is familiar in contempo-
rary fractal structure presented in complexity theory.
The ontology of EH is also close to that of the
metaphysics of “Ichinen-sanzen ron (three thousand
worlds in each thought-instant)” proposed by T’ien-
t’ai Chih-i. It explains each thought-instant (mind or
micro-cosmos), and three thousand worlds (macro-
cosmos) penetrate each other in unity. The micro-
cosmos includes the macro-cosmos and vice versa.
The T’ien-t’ai cosmological principle of “ichinen-
sanzen ron” is the culmination of Buddhist thought
whereby each dharma (truth) arising through the
causal process of prantitya samutpada (dependent
coorigination) is comprehended as a micro-cosmos
of the macro-cosmos. “Each thought-instant” means
not only psyche but also thing, because the subjec-
tivity of thing is important here. This concept of sub-
jectivity is now investigated with relation to Process-
philosophy.
(B) Experiencing subject
The definition of subject in EH is as follows: an
entity that is subjected to God's law is called a sub-
ject. To what level each entity is a subject is open to
investigation. For example, a stone is a subject up to
the fourth law sphere (physical sphere), because it is
subject to physical, kinematic, spatial, and numerical
laws, but not to biological laws. A lotus flower is a
subject up to the fifth law sphere (biological), and a
dog is a subject up to the sixth law sphere (sensible).
A human being is subject to all fifteen law spheres,
though the brain is a subject up to the biological
sphere. When I observe a butterfly alighting on the
lotus flower, the observed butterfly is an object, but
if we characterize the butterfly on the lotus flower in
the sensible aspect, the butterfly is a subject and the
lotus flower is the object. The subject and the object
transform each other dynamically from place to
place. Each entity in the world differs in the degree
of its subjectivity. This subjectivity is what I mean in
the word “experiencing subject,” that is, the subject
being defined in the meaning aspect or “experienc-
ing-as” aspect.
Another meaning is implicit in this “experiencing
subject.” When a subject is subjected to God’s law,
it is experiencing God’s will. Thus, it is an “experi-
encing subject.” Even in that case, the personal sub-
ject should be distinguished from the impersonal
subject in the degree of its experiencing. This dis-
tinction is the problem of responsibility (homo
respondens).26 A human is called an “understanding
subject” instead of an “experiencing subject,”
because there is a large jump in the emergence from
the impersonal being to the personal being. This
approach may be noted in hermeneutic philosophy
since Heidegger and Gadamer.
(C) The origin of meaning and 
the primordial nature of God
My mind gives meaning to the world. My mind
intuitively unifies the meaning aspect of reality.
Intuition gives unity to the whole of meaning by
alternately going to and coming back from the dif-
ferent meaning aspects. During this process, the
direction my mind takes is important. Does my mind
direct itself toward the transcendent (the Creator/the
Eternal Buddha) as the origin of meaning, or not? If
my mind directs itself upward, the world is seen as
full of meaning. However, if it does not, the empiri-
cal world will be absolutized; then we have the abso-
lutization of meaning, which leads my mind to see
the world polarized into two parts. The world will be
dichotomized, e.g., into nature vs. freedom, moder-
nity vs. tradition etc. Intuition can be called spirit
(pneuma) when considered from the side of religious
anthropology. In my opinion, the relation between
intuition and spirit is important in order to connect
34 Pro Rege—March 2004
 
scientific anthropology and religion. The spirit
meant here is the human spirit induced by God’s
Spirit.
Now let us compare my religious realism with the
God of Process-philosophy. Whitehead wrote as fol-
lows: “Viewed as primordial, he is the unlimited
conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of
potentiality. In this aspect, he is not before all cre-
ation, but with all creation.”27 This view corresponds
to T’ien-t’ai's Absolute Saddharma, absolute absolu-
tion or Buddha-man non-duality. “God with all cre-
ation” is the origin of meaning itself, which belongs
to “the primordial nature of God.” Further, “the
human spirit induced by God’s Spirit” belongs to
“the consequent nature of God.” Since the diverse
divine laws characterize entities in the world, it can
be expressed as the many-ness of God (T’ien-t’ai's
three thousand world). The following quotation from
Whitehead suggestively affirms this line of thought: 
In every respect God and the World move con-
versely to each other in respect to their process. God
is primordially one, namely, He is the primordial
unity of relevance of the many potential forms: in the
process He acquires a consequent multiplicity, which
the primordial character absorbs into its own unity.
The World is primordially many, namely, the many
actual occasions with their physical finitude; in the
process it acquires a consequent unity, which is a
novel occasion and is absorbed into the multiplicity
of the primordial character. Thus God is to be con-
ceived as one and as many in the converse sense in
which the World is to be conceived as many and as
one.28
Another interesting analysis may perhaps give the
interpretation that “the primordial nature of God”
corresponds to the first God-human contact as
explained by Katsumi Takizawa, and “the conse-
quent nature of God” to the second God-human con-
tact.29
(D) Information
In my opinion, the above approach, which sug-
gests a close relationship between mind and materi-
al science, has merit. It makes it clear that mind is
not a substance but depends on the brain and body,
and thus it recognizes the whole person as a psycho-
somatic entity. This person is laid open to the spiri-
tual world. We have already mentioned “informa-
tion,” which plays an important role in the commu-
nication between God and human persons, or God
and matter. Between the mind (the self, or the heart)
and brain, the concept of information has been con-
sidered as an independent variable. But might it not
be possible to say that material objects communicate
with each other through information? What then is
information? To clarify this point, let me point out an
analogous view in EH and Process-philosophy. The
concept of information discussed below is not the
syntactic information measured by bits but semantic
information.
In an article discussing “System philosophy and
Process-thought,” James Huchingson talks about
information in the following way: “We normally
understand information in terms of the intuitive
appropriation of communicated content which con-
veys existential or rational meaning.”30 In a word,
information is communication of meaning. In terms
of EH, we will express it as “differences of the
meaning aspect.” In EH reality is identified with the
irreducible fifteen meaning aspects, and each mean-
ing is defined to be “experiencing-as.” So each irre-
ducible meaning aspect is viewed as a basic unit of
experiencing. We remember here that Whitehead
defined the actual occasion as “drops of experi-
ence.”31 Thus, it is not so strange to see the irre-
ducible meaning aspect in EH as the “actual occa-
sion” in Process-philosophy. In other words, the
actual occasion can be expressed more dynamically
as a “crossing through irreducible meaning aspects.”
In other words, communication of meaning is just
information.
The above line of thought makes it easier to
understand the following sentence by Huchingson:
“An actual occasion is a discrete information 
processing system. Indeed, if we may understand
prehensions as signals, and the ingression of 
prehensions as the initial phase in a selective 
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process of self-actualization, then an actual occasion
consists purely of information.”32
Entities of everyday life are characterized and
articulated in the fifteen meaning aspects in the tem-
poral world, ordered and understood step by step. Is
this not a kind of “concrescence”? Listen to
Huchingson’s explanation: “Whitehead stresses that
the process of concrescence generates the order of
the world as the entropy-laden and disjunctive many
attain unity in the determinate form of the complet-
ed occasion.”33
Analogous thinking about “information” in EH
and Process-philosophy allows me to give an affir-
mative answer to my question. Namely, material
items do communicate with each other through
information. Water becomes ice, or a butterfly
alights on a lotus flower; these natural phenomena
are surely the communication of meaning or the flow
of information. In fact, entropy decreases when
water becomes ice or information circulates in the
bio-sphere.
Entities in the world communicate with each other
through information. The origin of meaning also
communicates with the world through information.
Information will become the most important concept
in religion, philosophy, and the sciences in the twen-
ty-first century.
5. Liberalism, communitarianism, and pluralism
How can we form a society that will assure each
person’s dignity and freedom? Related to this point,
what suggestion does Process-philosophy give?
Does Process-philosophy offer an adequate basis for
assurance of a free society? I wonder whether the
concept of a weak God makes it possible. In the 
traditional Japanese thought, the concept of a strong
God was given mainly by Nichiren’s sects who
believed the Lotus Sutra.
(A) The concept of Person in Buddhism
Buddhism does not presuppose a personal God,
nor does it have a concept of Creator. The Eternal
Buddha in Lotus Sutra is not a Creator, but a salva-
tion Lord. Why did Lotus Sutra insist on the Eternal
Buddha? Yoshiro Tamura answers this question in
three points [32]: (1) Clarifying Buddha’s views:
Unifying dharma (truth) is given in part II (houben-
hin) and unifying Buddha (person) is given in part
XV (or XVI) (nyoraijuryo-hin). (2) Eternal personal
life is always in the place of unifying truth. (3)
Eternal life is perceived in actual practical activity.34
The Eternal Buddha himself lived in the way of the
Bodhisattva.
Nichiren especially emphasized living in the way
of the Bodhisattva, claiming to be a practitioner of
Lotus Sutra. He was a rare religious person who
could criticize the state power and actually act in
such a way. In modern Japan, under the influence of
Nichiren, Ikki Kita proposed “statism” and Tyogyu
Takayama “transcending statism.” While both per-
sons are extreme in the opposite directions,
Nichiren’s thought was more balanced. Today, from
the viewpoint of eternal personal life, we should
seek a public space in Japan where Buddhists,
Christians, and Humanists can live on the basis of a
constitutional freedom according to their beliefs.
The role of the government is to assure this public
space by circumscribing its own power; at least it
should not force different groups of people to act in
a uniform or unanimous way.
(B) Public social philosophy
Over against old liberals such as Locke, Kant, and
Mill, communitarians claiming recovery of a public
space, such as MacIntyre, Taylor, and Sandel, came
into the debates on social philosophy after the 
seventies. Their coming parallels the rise of post-
modernism. Since the old liberalism, demanding the
maximal freedom for the individual (i.e., Sandel’s
unencumbered self), went to extreme individualism,
discarding social morals, people have welcomed the
traditional common senses of community. That 
welcome is quite natural.
However, this American communitarianism can-
not be imported easily into today’s Japan because
historically the concept of a public “individual” has
been very weak here. The weakness of that concept
is, in my opinion, due to the lack of the personal
transcendent concept that is always supra-state or
more than the political power. The shadow of State
Shintoism returned to national politics after the
1960s. It seems to function as a civil religion in
Japanese community, supporting a neo-nationalism.
The problem of the public “individual” in Japan is
now at the center of social debate. An individual is
born and bred in a certain community, but always
transcends that community. His or her mind is
always open to an unseen world: the primordial
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nature of God. I will call it the “spiritual world.” The
spiritual world is real, just as the social world and
physical world are real.
I want to propose this “spiritual world” as “World
4,” analogous to Karl Popper's concept of the open
society. It is well known that Popper presented
Worlds 1, 2, and 3.35 Thus I will propose that, in the
real world of Popper’s terminology, World 4 (the
spiritual world) should be added further to World 1
(brain, matter), World 2 (psyche, mind, heart), and
World 3 (scientific theory, art, social institutions,
etc.). World 4 will interact with worlds 1, 2, and 3
through information. World 4 interacts with World 2
in keeping directional pluralism, and interacts with
Worlds 1 and 3 in the cosmic laws.
The ways of pursuing science and democracy
within the public world (World 3) depend on the
concept of the true reality of World 4. Considering
the relationship between religions and cultures in
today’s global age will require this kind of religio-
scientific realism. Religio-scientific realism, or
Emergent Hermeneutics, is just a natural develop-
ment of the transcendental ontology developed by
Herman Dooyeweerd. The concept of “emergence”
is especially very close to the contemporary refined
version of his idea of “enkapsis,” which extends
from biological entities to social institutions.36
Finally, the Creator God is the origin of all natural
phenomena, and the Spirit leads the whole process
of human behavior. Thus, as the Trinitarian God is
the cause of the emergence of the world and human
beings, there is no room for autonomous indepen-
dent evolution. The concept of emergence presented
here is completely theistic emergence. I do not
believe in autonomous emergence caused by natu-
ralistic power. I reject even so-called methodologi-
cal naturalism. While emergences are observed
objectively as scientific laws in the natural world,
we interpret them as God’s laws. Our interpretive
action is called hermeneutics, in which the subjec-
tive, or personal, element is very important, even
though natural scientists prefer objectivity.
However, when we use the term “Emergent
Hermeneutics,” the term is half objective, because of
emergence, and half subjective, because of
hermeneutics. Even in scientific knowledge, the
subjective element is essential, for our scientific
knowledge is personal knowledge, as explained by
Michael Polanyi. It is interesting to observe that the
theory of complex systems explicitly shows the
nature of scientific knowledge in a deeper way than
does the theory of old simple systems. The concept
of Emergent Hermeneutics, therefore, is considered
one of today’s debates for the fields of science and
religion.
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